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Abstract
This study sets out to investigate the structural contradictions of accountability
deficits in global social governance, with the particular reference to the World
Bank Inspection Panel and its associated development NGOs. In theorising ‘global
social policy’ as a new field of social policy agendas, less attention has been
hitherto paid to the notion of accountability, which should have been placed at the
centre of discourses on global social governance. Given the absence of central
global government which can enforce the accountability mechanism, the World
Bank’s attempt to embrace external actors – particularly, international NGOs – as
key stakeholders contributes to filling the accountability gaps, thereby enhancing
the legitimacy of the Bank’s intervention in globalised social problems. This study
aims to locate not only the intersection of the accountability problem and global
social policy, but also some structural dilemmas embedded in the accountability of
policy transfers from global institutions to national social policy. By taking the two
investigation cases of the World Bank Inspection Panel (China and Argentina), it
identifies two modes of contradictions of global accountability: (i) the ‘abused’
which results from the overemphasis on accountability, thereby sidelining the
Bank’s effective functions; and (ii) the ‘phased denial’ which is the negative
outcome of the Bank’s deliberate controlling system designed to reduce the number
of accountability requests.
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INTRODUCTION: ACCOUNTABILITY AS A MISSING LINK IN GLOBAL
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE
The decades since the 1980s, as many scholars commonly assert, have seen the
retreat of state monopoly and the emergence of non-state actors in the domain of
national social policy (Deacon et al. 1997; George and Wilding 2002; Drezner 2002;
Sassen 2007). Before then the social policy agenda was mostly treated as an exclusive
sphere of the state’s unitary authorities, but it is no longer the monopolised property
of the state in the face of external challenges from both international financial
institutions (IFIs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). On top of this, the
globalization factor influencing the making of national social policy has been
highlighted as a new authoritative agenda that IFIs have begun to concentrate under
the neoliberal cloak of ‘strong globalization’ (Yeates 2001; Meyer 2000). Given the
absence of world government overseeing global social conflicts, it is fundamentally
impossible for any international actors to centralise the enforcement of effective
implementations and hold themselves accountable to those who are affected by
social policy transfers at the global level.
Consequently, the call for creating global governance in order to tackle a
growing array of globalised social problems – particularly, poverty alleviation and
other targeted agendas by UN Millennium Development Goals (UNMDGs) – has
been catapulted into the public as an alternative solution in responding to the
deficiency of binding enforcement mechanisms in the world polity (Gore 2004). The
concept of ‘governance without government’ now becomes a fancy buzzword
popularised among all international actors (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992); it can be
renamed ‘global social governance’ if global governance contends primarily with the
social policy prescriptions for national social policy being articulated by global
actors (Deacon 2007). Anchored in a networked web of varied stakeholders involved
in global social policy, the politics of global social governance promotes the
globalisation of redistribution, regulation and social rights, all of which aim to
reduce global inequality and facilitate welfare transfers from the rich to the poor at
the international level (Deacon 1999; Faist 2009). Indeed, global social governance is
able to provide a powerful discourse framework for not only politicising
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globalisation’s impact upon national social policy, but also bringing new players into
the making of social policy.
However, there is a missing link in theorising global social governance
which fails to capture the accountability deficit embedded in the legitimacy crisis of
international institutions, for the most part, the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs)
such as the World Bank (the Bank)1 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
(Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Buchanan and Keohane 2006). The question of
the public accountability of global governance is unavoidable and cannot be
answered simply by pointing at the control exercised by national governments over
international institutions or emphasising a progressive political alliance among non-
state actors. In fact, power disparities among nation-states lack accountability to
the billions affected by the powerful state’s decisions but excluded from its domestic
democratic process (Keohane 2003; Barnett and Duvall 2005). Global social
governance, with no accounts for accountability, would remain just as a void
repercussion of the normative approach to global social policy. At the centre of
discussion over global justice and governance should be, thus, a systematic analysis
of accountability relationships which can be diversified in accordance with the
power balance among global actors. This study is undertaken in this regard to
deepen the understanding of accountability in global social governance by looking
into accountability relationships between the World Bank Inspection Panel (the
Panel), development NGOs, and other parties involved as a benchmark
demonstrating both positive values and some contradictions concerning global
accountability.
The emerging consensus is that the legitimacy of global (social) governance
needs to be framed by the intersection of two contrary components of accountability
and effectiveness (Scharpf 1999; Keohane and Nye 2000). By now there is a substantial
amount of literature on the effectiveness of international regimes and diverse global
governance mechanisms (Young 1999; Miles et al. 2001). New sources for
development finance are also suggested by scholarly works in the sense of how to
1 The terms ‘World Bank’ and ‘the Bank’ are widely used in this paper and also they refer to the World
Bank Group of institutions which comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC).
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enhance the effectiveness of IFIs’ policy-based development projects (Atkinson
2005). In contrast, less discussion over accountability mechanisms at the global level,
hitherto, has found its way into print. This relative neglect further stands out in the
studies of global social policy. To fill in gaps in previous explanations between
effectiveness and accountability, this paper looks at the conditions, the limits, and
the potential for improvement of global accountability in international institutions,
with particular references to the World Bank, and at how accountability interacts
with other values such as policy effectiveness and participation. In so doing, the
paper addresses the following questions: (1) to what extent are those who shape
global social policies accountable to those affected by their decisions?; (2) are the
accountability deficits in the making of global social policy a serious obstacle to its
effectiveness and legitimacy?; (3) what can realistically be done to reduce these
deficits in global policy transfers?; and (4) can NGOs be a possible alternative to
help international institutions reduce the accountability gap?
To this end, the paper proceeds in four steps. First, it starts by exploring the
conceptualisation of accountability in the context of global social governance.
Second, it demonstrates the triangle relations between accountability, effectiveness
and legitimacy as an analytical framework for understanding how enhancing
accountability is necessarily tied in with diminishing effectiveness or vice versa.
Third, it advances the Panel as a public accountability mechanism through which
the World Bank and grass-roots NGOs claim and assess the Bank’s accountability
for social policy-related projects, and also investigates contradictions of its
accountability relationships. The conclusion puts forward the argument that the
notion of accountability should be counted as one of main components in theorising
global social governance.
GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THREE ASPECTS
Accountability is not a concept that easily lends itself to neat and precise definitions
(Newell and Bellour 2002; Dubnick and Justice 2006). Its application is also varying
according to the different conditions of national economies and politics where it would
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-004
4
be implemented.2 Despite its definition and scope being multifarious and slippery, the
conceptualisation of global accountability can be sought – even roughly – by extending
the analytical domains from the national to the global: forging global accountability by
analogising the notion of accountability at the national level. On the domestic front,
accountability implies that “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have
not been met” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29). In other words, decision-makers do not
enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to justify their actions vis-à-vis affected parties,
that is, stakeholders (Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005). In a democratic society, these
stakeholders must be able to evaluate the actions and omission of rulers and to sanction
them if their performance is poor by removing them from their positions of authority,
primarily through the electoral processes. The successful presence of accountability
requires institutional arrangements securing reliable information and communication
between decision-makers and stakeholders as well as institutional capacity to impose
penalties for poor performance. Therefore, the domestic logic of accountability relations
reflects a principal-agent view presenting rationalist mechanics in which the leading
actor or principal sets goals and employs agents to accomplish them (Mulgan 2003).
The primary accountability problematic lies in constraining the opportunistic behavior
of agents, and thereby principal’s authoritative sanctions lie at the heart of the
accountability relationship.
However, the enforcement mechanisms imposing sanctions for shortfalls in
compliance, which are well institutionalised in constitutional democracies, are less
likely to be arranged in public institutions at the global level (Weber 1999). Instead
of centralised enforcement, discussions of global accountability have centred on the
‘democratic deficits’ afflicting global governance in the sense that international
organisations have too much secrecy within internal processes and much
international organisational activity does not take place even in the shadow of
2 Melvin Dubnick and Jonathan Justice (2004: 14, 20) argue for a socially constructed analysis of the
accountability concept, cautioning that “any effort to categorize, measure, or model accountability
must be guided by the qualities of the construct, magnitude or ‘reality’ it is intended to represent” and
further advising that “students of accountability must be prepared to deal with alternative and shifting
manifestations of the concept depending on the issue and arena being examined.”
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democratic elections (Keohane and Nye 2000; Caporaso 2000; Nye 2001).
Accordingly, such a democratic question of global accountability generates three
dimensions characterising its distinctive path of interactions: (i) power does still
matter inside international institutions; (ii) accountability gaps between normative
ideas that international institutions create and actual practices that they project in
reality undermine effective governance; and (iii) external actors are invited as
counterparts who contribute to reducing the accountability deficit.
First, the poverty of democratic processes in global governance allows
accountability to be largely a matter of power (Kahler and Lake 2000; Keohane
2003). Given the continuous presence of power disparities among government
members within international institutions, coercion and bargaining would be the
chief means of influence in the internal process of decision making, rather than
persuasion and emulation. Powerful states seek to link the various levels of
governance more effectively rather than to allow themselves only to serve as
elements of a broader structure of global governance. In fact, the World Bank has
been regularly accused of being secretive, non-participatory, and unaccountable,
because of its democratic deficits rooted in unequal representation on the Executive
Boards, non-transparent process of the Bank head selection, and its structural limits
of ‘one-dollar-one-vote’ system (Woods 2001; Berkman 2008).3 While powerful
members have more say on decision-making process than lesser ones, they are
reluctant to make proactive response to the external claims of the Bank’s
accountability. The Bank’s emphasis on the importance of global social
accountability since the late 1990s is not inherently linked to the diffusion of power
or the expansion of democratic governance (Malena et al. 2004).4 In a nutshell,
power politics within international institutions debilitates internal accountability,
which refers to organisational mechanisms in which internal members can directly
3 In terms of the composition of the Board of Executive Directors, only the largest member countries –
such as the United States, Germany, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Russia and China
– are directly represented by their own Executive Directors. All other members are grouped within
constituencies each represented by just one Executive Director.
4 According to World Development Report 1990 (Poverty), 2000/2001 (Attacking Poverty), and 2004
(Making Services Work for Poor People), the Bank’s social policy contents and influence have changed over
years from residual and targeted poverty alleviation to rights-based approach allowing the number of
external stakeholders to enhance social accountability in conjunction with extended poverty
alleviation (Vetterlein 2007).
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hold the powerful to account, mainly through transparent and equal elections for the
Executive Boards.
Second, the accountability gaps resulting from discrepancies between
principal’s demands on an agent to report his or her activities and the agent’s
response to it call for the institutionalisation of mechanisms for monitoring and
evaluation in order to fill in the gaps. The problem of accountability gaps comes from
such situations that certain entities affected by the Bank’s development projects
claim the right to hold agents – in this case, the Bank and its associated
implementation agencies – accountable, but the agents do not recognize a
corresponding obligation (Keohane 2003, Woods 2007). Lack of internal
accountability within the Bank, more often than not, heightens the incidence of such
accountability gaps. The consequence relates to the introduction of institutional
arrangements assessing conducted projects and reinforcing the monitoring process.
In fact, the birth of the Panel is identified with a result of the Bank’s institutional
attempts to listen to stakeholders’ claims, thereby narrowing the accountability
gaps between valid normative arguments for accountability to member states within
the internal process of social policy and actual practices (Shihata 2000).
Finally, the realistic solution for enhancing global accountability in the face
of the problem of accountability gaps ends up as the expansion of external
accountability, which means accountability to people outside the acting entity,
whose lives are affected by it.5 Given that enhancing internal accountability
through transparent voting systems is not an easy task for the Executive Boards to
go in for, more reformative weight is put on the issue of external accountability
based upon institutional openness to external groups of stakeholders, the horizontal
expansion of accountability, and the promotion of plural participation (Weisband
and Ebrahim 2007; Macdonald 2006). The corresponding external sector to the
request of such participation for global accountability is mostly identified with
5 Along with the distinctions of internal and external accountability, there is another dichotomy of
accountability: vertical and horizontal (Goetz and Jenkins 2001: 7). ‘Vertical accountability’ refers to
mechanisms in which certain entities can directly hold the powerful to account, such as through their
voting by which voters select representatives and also hold incumbents to account. ‘Horizontal
accountability’ refers to inter-institutional mechanisms or checks and balances. In other words, the
notion of horizontal accountability might be close to that of external accountability, and vertical
accountability is, in fact, interchangeable with internal accountability.
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international NGOs and civil society associations which are associated with the
Bank’s social policy-related projects. Various observations have suggested that civil
society associations do indeed offer significant possibilities to increase democratic
accountability in global regulatory arrangements by pluralising stakeholders and
delivering claims on behalf of affected people (O’Brien et al. 2000; Scholte 2002;
Winters 2010). In this vein, the World Society theory also confirms that the rise of
non-governmental organisational work around global governance conveys the
isomorphic alignment of participatory engagement or actorhood, which comes to be
structured around procedures of accountability and transparency (Meyer et al. 1997;
Drori 2006). In practice, the Panel is deliberately designed as the Bank’s institutional
apparatus to embrace the claims and participation of NGOs for the purpose of
fostering external accountability (Wade 2009). Accordingly, the conceptualisation of
global accountability is to observe accountability as a form of participatory praxis,
thereby identifying its impacts on internal relations as well as the configurations of
power, albeit the continuing occurrence of democratic deficits within international
institutions such as the World Bank.
TRIANGULAR LINKS FOR GLOBAL SOCIAL GOVERNANCE:
ACCOUNTABILITY, EFFECTIVENESS, AND CONTRADICTIONS
The discussion above provides us conceptual bases for the triangular relations of
accountability, effectiveness, and global social governance. Considering the fact that
contemporary literature on global social policy is normatively demanding but
theoretically weak in terms of accountability, it is undoubtedly meaningful to delve
into the relatedness of accountability to governance in tandem with the notion of
effectiveness. Indeed, where accountability meets governance at the global level is,
always, a mixed bag packed by the intersection of globalisation, participation, and
the attempt to promote the effective governance on policy diffusion (Goetz and
Jenkins 2001).
‘Global social governance’ refers to not only rule making and power exercise
within a given domain of social policy at a global scale, but also transparent
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FIGURE 1. TRIANGULAR RELATIONS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Source: Woods (2007: 31). Modification added.
monitoring of the process of implementing assigned social policy; it is conducted not
necessarily by entities authorised by general agreement to act but in many cases by
their collaboration with external stakeholders, particularly NGOs.6 Therefore, the
legitimacy of global social governance needs to be assessed from the point of view of
both effectiveness and accountability. Strengthening the legitimacy of global social
governance in international institutions rests on the following ways of valuation:
enhancing effectiveness, improving accountability, or both. However, a widespread
belief is that the underlying mechanism is based upon a trade-off between
accountability and effectiveness (Keohane and Nye 2000: 391; Held and Koenig-
Archibugi 2005; Kim 2008). As figure 1 demonstrates, accountability is outpaced by
the expansion of effectiveness in mandates of international institutions; likewise,
process designed to enhance effectiveness may turn out to be counterproductive in
terms of accountability.
Effective institutions are assumed to enjoy a coercive capacity to make rules
6 Another definition of global social governance can be drawn out from Leon Gordenker and Thomas
Weiss’s conceptualisation (1996: 17): “efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social
policy issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually”.
LEGITIMACY
EFFECTIVENESSACCOUNTABILITY
Accountable but ineffectual
(Participatory, representative
and inclusive such well-run
Parliaments or the UN
General Assembly)
Effective but unaccountable
(Non-participatory and often
strictly hierarchical such as a
central bank or military
command structure)
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and enforce them. At the extreme this implies institutions run by powerful states
with little restraint from both internal and external actors. By contrast, accountable
institutions are assumed to spend too much time and resources for ensuring
representation and participation, despite the fact that accountability is alternatively
able to have some positive effects to restrain power struggle among nations within
international institutions. Accordingly, an overemphasis upon either side of
accountability or effectiveness brings about the lack of legitimacy in managing
democratic governance of global social institutions. Despite the normative appeal of
transparency, making information and open elections available about the decision-
making process may undermine the ability of international institutions to produce
optimal bargains among member states, thereby weakening their legitimacy.
Increasing the transparency of such internal processes to outside actors – external
accountability – could prevent member states from reaching a mutually beneficial
conclusion. Conversely, the BWI’s ‘effectiveness-first’ argument prioritising positive
outcomes of policy-based projects rather than democratic processes to create and
monitor policies leads to some successful proposals for improving global governance
but is bound to confront harsh criticisms from external actors who demand the
enhancement of accountability. In short, the logic which pits effectiveness against
accountability – or the other way around – would come up with diminishing
legitimacy of global social governance if it goes too extreme with one against another.
Against such a zero-sum relationship between accountability and
effectiveness, it is rather suggested that negative impacts of trade-offs on the
legitimacy of governance can be neutralised by reforming international institutions
(Woods 2002). Institutionalising an independent body acting as the accountability
mechanism inside international institutions has been a common prescription for
balancing effectiveness and accountability in an eclectic and constructive fashion.
The Panel, as a transparent system of accountability, is intended to provide an
institutional channel for project-affected people, or NGOs acting in their name, to
lodge claims – bypassing their own government – that the Bank has not fully
complied with its operational directives and their welfare has been harmed as a
result (Clark 2003). On the request of advocacy NGOs, the Panel’s investigation is
aimed to ensure that public funds are spent more consistently with the Bank’s
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mandate of sustainable development and poverty alleviation. Thus, enhancing
accountability by investigating the requested complaints of advocacy NGOs
contributes to bringing unaccountable projects back on the right track in
compliance with the Bank’s original directives, thereby restoring effectiveness in the
end. All in all, as Ngaire Woods (2007: 31) pinpoints, there is no clear trade-offs
between accountability and effectiveness, in the sense that the former is not always
incompatible with the latter. The blind assumption on such trade-offs might create a
false dichotomy.
The triangular interrelations above, which are taken as an analytical
framework in this study, require us to look on further understanding of NGO
accountability in two aspects. First, the Bank has been reluctant to strengthen
internal accountability and instead put more attention on the expansion of external
accountability, particularly via the mobilisation of international NGOs as a main
stakeholder. Therefore, in parallel with the Panel, NGOs also need to hold their civic
participation in the Panel’s investigations to be accountable for both the Panel and
project-affected people whom they advocate.7 Second, NGOs’ excessive engagement
with the accountability deficit brings about contradictive outgrowths, which rather
entail either diminishing accountability or much dwindling effectiveness.
NGO ACCOUNTABILITY
Against the widespread optimism of NGO involvements in the World Bank, NGOs
pose a more difficult issue in terms of accountability. In a positive sense, civil society
organisations elicit greater accountability in four main ways: by increasing the
public transparency of global governance operation; by monitoring and reviewing
global social policy; by seeking redress for mistakes of global regulatory bodies; and
by creating formal accountability mechanisms for global social governance (Scholte
2002; Brown and Fox 1998). However, as Robert Keohane (2003: 148) describes,
NGOs’ legitimacy and their accountability are often disconnected in negative terms.
7 The World Bank (2004: 3) defines social accountability as “an approach towards building
accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society
organisations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability.”
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In general, NGO advocacy does not trigger a need for external accountability to the
community, and no clear accountability holder exists in any event. International
NGOs are mostly accountable to wealthy, relatively public-spirited people in the
United States and other rich countries, who do not experience the results of their
actions. In this regard, there is a serious danger that NGOs tends to engage in
symbolic politics full of democratic but unrealistic discourses, satisfying to their
internal constituencies but unresponsive to the real needs of the people whom they
claim to serve. Also, they do not have capacity to control resources directly; their
influence of moral claims can be only delivered through persuasion, lobbying or
media presence. Accordingly, it is wrong to state that NGOs should be treated as a
best solution to make up for the dearth of accountability in international institutions
(Wade 2009: 26-27).
In reality, NGO accountability is being oppositely addressed in the reports
of major international advisory commissions (Charnovitz 2007). In June 2004, the
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations appointed by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered its report with the suggestion that UN
practices for engaging civil society should be accompanied by defining standards of
governance such as transparency and accountability. The UN Secretariat should
consult with advocacy NGOs advising the UN self-policing mechanisms to heighten
effective governance. In stark contrast, a Consultative Board appointed by the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General, in January 2005, delivered an
extensive report including negative accounts on NGO accountability. The Board
noted the criticism that NGOs’ lobbying for more influence is often neither
accountable nor particularly transparent. As a result, it is true to say that active
participations of civil society organisations contribute to enhancing accountability of
global governance. However, it is also fair to state that any positive influence of NGO
engagement is possibly shaped only when international institutions acknowledge
NGOs as a genuine partner to taper accountability gaps; otherwise, NGOs’ excessive
involvement will generate serious contradictive outcomes that it do not expect to
bear.
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TWO MODES OF CONTRADICTIONS
There are, by and large, two possible contradictions that the World Bank is bound
to confront when NGOs are singled out as a key external participant for the purpose
of rectifying the democratic deficit in the dimension of accountability. These
contradictions capture different paths of mutual relations among multi-stakeholders
including the World Bank, the Panel, advocacy NGOs, and some particular
governments involved. They also demonstrate the complex dynamics in evaluating
the Bank’s social policy implementations under the triangular value structure of
global social governance.
The first front of contradictions lies in the abuse of inspection requests by
advocacy NGOs (Woods 2002; Wade 2009). The algorithm of abused contradictions
is founded on the premise that the Panel is abused by limitless claims from affected
groups and Washington-based NGOs advocating them who demand the full
investigations of the Bank projects that violate its operational directives. By opening
up the possibility for complaints to be addressed by any groups affected by the
Bank’s social policy programmes, the Bank is endangered due to the exploitation of
the Panel, which requires high cost of extra money and time. The overemphasis on
external accountability ultimately cripples effective governance for implementing
targeted projects, thereby deepening the detriment of the disadvantaged groups who
the Bank sets out to assist. In consequence, NGOs’ excessive demands on
accountability become counterproductive in terms of effectiveness, and end up with
the failure of their initial objectives and much reduced legitimacy of global
governance.
The algorithm of the second pattern is based upon the politics of manipulated
accountability. The Bank’s deliberate restraints controlling expanded NGO requests,
despite its formal call for external stakeholders and the establishment of the
accountability mechanisms, provide dual strategic benefits for the World Bank itself.
On the one hand, the Bank is explicitly able to show its reformative image of
enhancing accountability and opening an official channel (the Panel) for legal and
direct claims to public stakeholders, particularly NGOs and policy-affected groups.
The resultant effect is to advertise and even engrave a positive vision of the Bank’s
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efforts for more accountability in the popular perception and imagination. However,
on the other hand, the underlying rationale of the Panel needs to be considered a
strategic reflection of the Bank’s planned purposes. It is aimed to set in motion
internal restraints on NGOs’ external requests claiming for the Panel’s formal
investigation. The following consequence is that the actual number of the claims
which NGOs request and the Panel completes to investigate turned out to be very
small, and many cases failed to receive final reports of Panel investigations, thereby
being closed prior to the completion of the whole processes of investigations. Such a
Janus-faced accountability mechanism equips the Bank with institutional shackles
to internalise screening processes designed for softening external challenges from
NGOs, whereas it contributes to purifying its notorious image with the lack of
accountability. In a nutshell, the Panel’s functions for improving accountability
would be overshadowed by its internal constraints manipulating the processes,
which, ultimately, results in weakening accountability or no particular progress at
all in terms of accountability. This contradiction catches the Bank in its own trap of
accountability deficits, leading to the declining legitimacy of its global social
governance.
Accordingly, it is fair to state that enhancing accountability through the
adoption of external actors with no serious reforms of internal transparencies within
the World Bank presents not only contradictions of global social governance in
legitimizing and diffusing global social policy to the localities, but also damaging the
rationale of its accountability mechanisms. The next section will explore two
specific cases of Panel investigations in order to uncover the practical appliance of
these two contradictions lying at the centre of the Bank’s accountability problems.
THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: ABUSED OR RESTRAINED?
That World Bank funding is not reaching its ultimate intended destination is not
surprising. Significant allegations of corruption and the misuse of funds in World
Bank projects related to social policy are widespread (Klitgaard 1990; Maren 1997;
Goldman 2005; Berkman 2008). In response to them, the Bank took initiative to
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raise social development to the level of core issue within its development strategy,
from targeted poverty alleviation to empowering people based on the rights-based
approach (Vetterlein 2007; Goldman 2005; Jordan 2007). Particularly, the Bank’s
reaction to the critiques against its accountability problem is the expansion of
external accountability by encouraging (or utilising) the participation of
development NGOs in order to fill the gaps of accountability deficits.
Characteristically, the creation of the Panel enables the Bank to listen to civil-
society claims and embrace accountability by NGO participatory engagements.
The Panel was established in September 1993 by the Board of Executive
Directors of the World Bank to serve as an independent institution to improve the
accountability deficits in Bank operations with respect to its policies and procedures
(Shihata 2000). The Panel is an instrument for groups of two or more private citizens
who believe that they or their interests have been or could be harmed by Bank-directed
development projects to present their concerns through a Request for Inspection. It
was an ambitious step towards the reform of accountability creating a more
transparent environment for the agencies involved in Bank-financed activities to follow
the policies and mandates of the institution. The role of the Panel was especially
important in its legitimacy to provide recommendations to the upper policy makers and
empower the voices of affected people in recipient countries. In short, the Panel
provides a direct link between the Bank and the people who are likely to be affected by
the projects it finances.
Along with its ambitious motivation and principles, our analytical utility in
this case study of the Panel needs to be addressed with the following question: can it be
stated that the Panel succeeded in making the Bank more accountable and transparent?
In a much broader sense, this question relates to whether the World Bank is merely
adapting to assertive demands from the outside world, or it is proactively engaging in
innovative behaviour. In exploring the Panel, this study reveals two observations: (i)
there are some internal institutional devices set in its investigation procedures, which
are designed to slow down or deactivate the requests for inspection; and (ii) two
contradictive relations around accountability gaps discussed above are, both,
discovered in some cases of the Panel’s past claims. Thus, those findings are not
necessarily supportive to the Panel’s ambitious motivation and objectives.
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THE INSPECTION PANEL PROCEDURE AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The guiding discourse of the Panel’s outreach and inspection processes reflects a
confluence of accountability gaps that come from what one observer calls the
finance ministry agenda of neoliberalism and the civil society agenda of social justice
and poverty alleviation (Hall 2007). The Panel is a quasi-independent body created
by the Bank as a mechanism for holding the Bank accountable for violations of its
policies and procedures. In this sense, the Panel focuses on the Bank’s role in a
project and whether nor not the Bank is in compliance with its policies and
principles.
The Panel procedures for inspection can be largely divided into three
sequences (see figure 2). The first step is ‘the registration of request’ in which two or
more adversely affected people who share common interests or concerns meet basic
eligibility requirements can file a claim to the Panel. To meet the Panel’s eligibility
requirements, claimants must allege some basic elements; otherwise, their requests
are overruled.8 The second stage is ‘the eligibility phase’ for inspection, in which
the Panel, once a claim is filed, determines whether it meets the eligibility criteria
and after the completion of reviewing eligibility, it recommends to the Board of
Executive Directors (the Board) whether or not the claim should be investigated.
The recommendation should be approved by the Board before the Panel embarks
upon the procedure of investigation. The third stage includes ‘the investigation
phase’ in which the three-member Panel investigates registered claims, provided
that the claim meets certain standards and the Board agrees to an investigation. If an
investigation takes place, the Panel presents its findings to the Board in a report, and
the Board asks Management to provide recommendations for how to respond. Based
on the Panel report and Management’s recommendations, the Board, then,
announces an Action Plan for resolving any policy violations, or denies all or some
8 There are four basic requirements of the Panel’s eligibility: (i) claimants are two or more people with
common interests or concerns living in a country or an area affected by a Bank-financed project; (ii) the
Bank has violated its policies and procedures, and they have or are likely to suffer material adverse effects
as a result of those policy violations; (iii) they have attempted to raise their concerns with Bank
Management and are not satisfied with the response; and (iv) the project is under consideration or has
been approved by the Bank, and the loan has not yet been substantially disbursed (Shihata 2000: 71).
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parts of the Panel’s report if it
Source:
Practically, the above process has been
manipulation by Bank Management and the Board for three reasons on the whole.
First of all, the Panel’s investigation encounters the call for its postponement or even
abandonment at any phase of inspection
denial’ of inspection, the Bank’s organs such as the Panel, Management and the
Board can enjoy the sequential leeway in denying the claims of requesters at three
stages of registration, eligibility, and investigation, whenever th
the criteria at each phase. As table 1 and appendix I show, it is surprising to note
that among 59 claims brought by NGOs or other affected groups from 1994 to 2010,
only 4 (6.8 percent) were able to receive full and final approval fro
which means that the Board accepted and complied all the recommendations
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reported by recommendations reported by the Panel if the Board finally reaches a
TABLE 1. INSPECTION PANEL CLAIMS SUMMARY (AS OF APRIL 2010)
Phases Number of claims Percentage
Registration phase (rejected) 7 11.9
Eligibility phase (rejected) 19 32.2
Investigation phase
Rejected 5 8.5
Partial approval 16 27.1
Pending 5 8.5
Board’s full approval 4 6.8
Under progress 3 5.1
Total 59 100
Source: Compiled by author. Refer to appendix I.
conclusion that the Panel.9 The other 55 failed to do so, albeit variations in density
and stages of rejection: 7 (11.9 percent) denied at the registration phase; 19 (32.2) at
the eligibility phase; and 5 (8.5) at the investigation phase. 16 (27.1 percent), though,
obtained partial approval from the Board at the investigation stage, but the Panel’s
original report on the findings was to some degree ruled out by either the Board’s
decision or Management’s Action Plan in response to the report. In this regard, the
deliberate set of internal constraints on the Panel’s investigation procedure enables
the Bank to coordinate and manipulate the level of acceptance of requesters’ claims
in favour of the Bank’s loan policy. Looking at the results of the Panel’s investigation,
we cannot see the relevance of abused accountability because there are very few
claims that successfully passed the final stage of accepting the Panel’s investigation.
Rather, the point of contradiction in terms of accountability comes from the Bank’s
intentional manipulation of the inspection procedure, thereby no critical progress in
enhancing accountability.
Nevertheless and secondly, there are indications of external stakeholders’
9 According to author’s contents analysis on the past claims (see appendix I), the four claims include
(i) 1994 Arun III Hydroelectric Project & Restructuring of IDA Credit (Nepal); (ii) 1999 Western
Poverty Reduction Project (China); (iii) 2004 National Drainage Program Project (Pakistan); and (iv)
2007 Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-Up Project (Albania).
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abuse of accountability. An initial problem with the Panel stems from its
overreliance on to what extent projects are in compliance with its own directives
and procedure (Wade 2009). Given that almost any project can be found to be out of
compliance if one pushes hard enough, there is no limit to the claims that affected
groups or NGOs can bring so that the Bank is likely to be deluged with Panel
investigations. Also, there is no time limit within which the Board must act on the
Panel’s recommendation. The Board repeatedly delays consideration of and decision
on the Panel’s recommendation. In consequence, minor legal infraction can be used
as a weapon for much larger political purposes, and additional cost and time need to
be marshalled for implementing abused requests of claimants (Schmitter and
O’Donnell 1999). The following consequence in this context lies in diminishing
effectiveness of the Bank policy operation.
The third problem is the tendency of the process to become highly
politicised at the investigation phase (Clark 2003). In many cases, the recipient
country where the Bank’s projects are located generally resists investigations by the
Panel and the claims requested by NGOs. In the meantime, Bank Management is
able to manipulate this political resistance to promote the adoption of Management-
generated Action Plans as an alternative to an investigation. In doing so,
Management intends to avoid scrutiny of policy violations and the Bank’s role in the
problems. This politicised relationship between various players ultimately
undermines the accountability function of the Panel process.
Taken into account those weak points of the Panel, a further detailed
comparison with the following two cases regarding accountability problems is of
great use to understand the sources of contradiction in the Bank’s social policy-
related projects.
ACCOUNTABILITY ABUSED: CHINA WESTERN POVERTY REDUCTION PROJECT
The China Western Poverty Reduction Project (Qinghai Project) has been often
spotlighted as a success case that reflects the abuse of accountability relations among
the Bank, the Panel, NGOs, US government and Chinese government, all of which
drove the Bank operation in the province of Qinghai in Western China, next to the
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Tibet Autonomous Region, in 1999 (World Bank 2000; Clark and Treakle 2003). It
was also the first claim the Board went through a full investigation in response to the
Panel recommendations. The claim had been filed by the International Campaign for
Tibet (ICT), serving as a non-local, US-based NGO advocating the rights of the
Tibetan people living in the project area. In requesting the Panel to conduct an
investigation, the Board avoided commenting on ICT’s eligibility but essentially
supported a full investigation into the policy violations alleged in ICT’s claim.
At the initial stage, the Qinghai Project matched well with the Bank’s general
social policy guideline of alleviating poverty and economic development in poor areas
of developing countries. Under close consultations with the Bank, the Chinese
government launched this Project with the aim of population resettlement,
environmental development, and poverty reduction in its Western territory. It
planned to replace the current inhabitants of mostly Tibetans and Mongols in the
barren Tibetan plateau with a large number of poor farmers of Han Chinese or
Chinese Muslim. The Chinese government policy of population transfer triggered
transnational NGO coalitions not only issuing the genocide of the ethnic Tibetans
and Mongols but also advocating human rights of local minorities in the area. The
claimants’ argument was based upon the mandate of the World Bank, one that the
violation of its policies on the indigenous people and involuntary resettlement are not
acceptable (Clark and Treakle 2003). The Tibetans also sought international
advocacy from their support groups such as the Tibet Government In Exile and the
ICT to represent their positions in the international stage.
In response to ICT-centred demands for investigation, the Panel undertook
its first ever full-scale investigation, and submitted a report to the Board with the
recommendations critical of the Bank and supportive of the campaigners’ claims.
After lengthy discussions between the Chinese Prime Minister’s Office, the US
Treasury and President of the Bank, the case of the Qinghai Project was dismissed by
the Board’s decision of withdrawing the project from the Bank (Wade 2009). This
was the first case in which the Bank gave a full approval to the Panel’s investigation.
Behind the NGO campaigners’ victory, however, there are three negative
impacts on accountability. First, the abuse of inspections or external accountability
agencies cost money and take time (Woods 2000: 94). The East Asian region of the
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Bank spent about 3 million USD on the Panel’s investigation of Qinghai, plus the
extra costs borne by the Chinese government, and another 2.5 million USD on the
extra work that the East Asian region proposed. The extra work that the Panel report
called for required additional 4 million USD, or 10 percent of the total loan. This
abused accountability leads to further detriment of already affected groups that the
Bank set out to aid. In the end, the abused attempt for accountability generates the
diminution of effectiveness.
Second, the close connection between US government and Washington-
based NGOs creates ‘moral hazard’ in the sense that the role of NGOs degenerated
into an extended arm of the United States or the largest donor member in the Bank
(Wade 2009: 28). Moral hazard may be perilous as it widens gaps between the
powerful donors and weak third-world locals, and NGOs act certain decisions only
in accordance with the principles of the governments they receive financial supports
from. In the Qinghai Project, without serious consideration of the borrowing
country’s local situation and needs, emphasising the shared consensus of US-based
NGOs and US government – pro-civil society, pro-environment, or pro-human rights
– often leads to greater losses and policy failure.
Third, power politics still matters to greater degree. The Bank itself abused
the Panel in order to escape from the dilemma of choosing the United States, the
largest donor, and China, the largest and best-performing borrower (Wade 2002). If
the Bank decided to deny filing the claim, it could lose a large amount of fund and
supports of pro-US members. When faced with this difficult situation, the Board
pressed the Panel to issue a report in favour of the US preference and likeminded
NGOs, thereby legitimising the Bank’s withdrawal of the Qinghai Project. On top of
this power struggle, China’s violation of human rights in the Tibetan area was also
politicised and instrumentalised to heighten the position of US-based NGOs.
All in all, the China Western Poverty Reduction Project demonstrates the
source of contradiction in terms of trade-offs between abused accountability and its
entailing decrease in effectiveness. Nevertheless, it should be also noted that the
Panel’s full-scale investigation and the Board’s full acceptance of the Panel’s
recommendation cannot be easily orchestrated without powerful donor’s
machination to support the Board’s decision to proceed in that way.
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ACCOUNTABILITY RESTRAINED: ARGENTINA SPECIAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
In July 1999, the case of Argentina’s Garden Programme (Pro-Huerta) was requested by
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS: the Centre for Legal and Social Studies),
an Argentine NGO representing about 418 beneficiaries of the Pro Huerta programme
which was a food security program designed to help the poor of the Pro Huerta
community maintain small vegetable gardens to produce food for their own
consumption. The amount of money budgeted for the Pro Huerta program was
proposed to be cut by nearly 65 percent. The Panel started to review the eligibility of
the Garden Programme request with the focus on why the budget for the Garden
Programme was shrunk without reasonable causes, and Management persuaded the
borrower – Argentine government – to provide an additional 3 million USD to the Pro
Huerta programme, nearly doubling its budget. As a result, the Panel was told during
its visit that the Argentine government had decided to allocate another 1.5 million USD
in lottery revenues to the Pro Huerta programme. Because the potential harm claimed
by the Requesters appeared to have been averted and the problem was solved, the Panel
did not recommend a formal investigation so that the claim for the Pro Huerta Project
was completed without a further investigation.
This case presents two important implications in relations to accountability.
First, the Pro Huerta case captures a new pattern of the Bank’s policy conditionality:
‘social protection conditionality’ in World Bank structural adjustment loans
(Abromavich 2003). In 1998, after the Brazilian economic crisis, Argentina received a
structural adjustment loan from the Bank for 2.5 billion USD, designed to encourage
economic policy reforms to forestall a currency devaluation and reinforce the country’s
capacity for sustained economic growth with social equity. Therefore, the loan included
‘Social Budget Conditions’ to ensure a minimum 680 million USD to support a package
of ongoing social safety net programmes listed in the agreement. However, due to
legislative elections in 1999, the Argentine government hoarded the social budget funds
to favour those programmes traditionally used as instruments of political clientalism.
This diversion led the other social safety programmes in the package list to suffer deep
budget cuts, resulting in almost deleting social programmes from the loan
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conditionality. The Garden Programme, which was listed among the guaranteed social
programmes, was one of those programmes threatened with extinction. In this context,
it is important to note that this case has opened possibilities for using the Panel as an
international mechanism for protecting social interests covered by social policy
programmes, thus enhancing accountability in the Bank’s neoliberal structural
adjustment loan.
Second, the request of investigation on the Pro Huerta programme, despite its
successful completion in restoring government’s social budget, needs to be
reconsidered as a case of unfinished accountability. The primary reason for this
statement resulted from the Bank’s cessation of this case in the face of local NGOs’
continuous calls for further investigation. Also, CELS staffs have faced threats as they
work to uphold the social rights of those who suffer poverty vis-à-vis the state; they
had to make their claims to the Bank expressly keeping their identities confidential to
avoid reprisals from the government. There was no possibility of effectively denouncing
the Bank’s inaction in local courts. When the Bank shuts down a particular claim filed
by the Panel, there is no more alternative way for NGOs to claim further investigation.
It can be concluded that the case of Garden Programme in Argentina shows
that the contradiction of accountability relations could take place in lines with
institutional constraints by which the Bank is able to control or even deactivate the
request of investigation claimed by external stakeholders. Thus, the improvement of
accountability in this case would be limited or not necessarily reinforced.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: ACCOUNTABILITY AS A NECESSARY FACTOR
IN EXPLAINING GLOBAL SOCIAL GOVERNANCE
As Robert W. Cox (1999) aptly argues, global social governance is required to take
initiative for bridging varieties of groups disadvantaged by globalisation and devising
a common strategy to protect a regime of social equity against the penetration of
strong globalisation. The diffusion of global social policy can be identified with the
redistribution of public goods at the global level (Kaul et al. 2003). More recently, the
contribution of Amartya Sen (1999)’s ‘capability approach’ has been widely
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acknowledged as a pioneering idea within which poverty is seen in part as a matter of
TABLE 2. TWO CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PANEL’S ACCOUNTABILITY
Contradiction by Abuse Contradiction by Restraints
 Trade-offs between accountability
and effectiveness
 NGOs’ abused requests for
investigation
 Diminishing effectiveness of the
Bank’s development projects
 China Western Poverty Reduction
Project (1999)
 No clear trade-offs between
accountability and effectiveness
 NGOs’ failed requests for
investigation
 No clear negative effects to
effectiveness
 Argentina’s Special Structural
Adjustment Loan (1999)
capabilities addressing issues of the voices of the poor. Margaret Archer (2008) also
emphasises role of global governance as the underlying system to promote social
integration through civic participation at the global level. Most scholarly concerns
about global social governance may share the importance of the notion of
accountability, but a valid work analysing the relationship between governance and
accountability is not yet widespread in social policy studies. In this regard, this study
is aimed to not only explore the triangular relations of accountability, effectiveness
and the legitimacy of global governance, but also detect two different modes of
contradictions in terms of accountability with the specific reference to the World
Bank Inspection Panel. In particular, the notion of accountability needs to be
included as a new component of Bob Deacon’s three Rs-based conceptualisation of
global social policy in the form of global accountability.
As a critical finding, this paper uncovers the fact that the contradictory
consequences in the process of narrowing accountability gaps proceed in two
different paths, whose embeddedness is shaped either by the actors’ abuse of the
accountability mechanism or by the Panel’s internal devices constraining external
stakeholders (see table 2). As the case of the Qinghai Project well displays, ‘the
contradiction by abuse’ is based on trade-offs between accountability and
effectiveness, which ultimately result in undermining the legitimacy of global
governance. Thus, the overreliance on accountability for the purpose of enhancing
the legitimacy is inevitably counterproductive in the matter of effectiveness. By
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contrast, the case of Argentina’s Pro Huerta Project focuses on the Panel’s internal
constraints designed for the phased denial of NGOs’ requests for investigation. The
Panel, whose fundamental purpose is to avert the lack of accountability and protect
the voices of affected groups, contributes to rather hampering its initial tasks by
means of institutional shackles controlling the claimant’s requests.
One clear lesson from this study is that the expansion of external
accountability – primarily, by embracing international NGOs – is not a panacea for
all the social problems at the global level. It is quite evident that external
accountability leads the Panel and the Bank itself to confront with some
contradictions as the final result of their engagement with accountability gaps. Thus,
an alternative solution, as Ngaire Woods (2000) suggests, is to adopt the
enhancement of internal accountability, which directly relates to the reformative
introduction of transparent elections of the Board. This sounds not easy processes
but is critical enough for us to take it as our research task ahead.
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APPENDIX 1. INSPECTION PANEL’S RESOLUTIONS AS APPLIED IN PRACTICE, 1994-2010
Year Filed & Name of Project Panel RecommendsInvestigation
Board Decision on
Investigation Outcome
1994 Arun III Hydroelectric Project & Restructuring of IDA Credit (Nepal) Yes. Approved. Project cancelled by Bank
President.
1995 Compensation for Expropriation & Extension of IDA Credits
(Ethiopia)
No. Not registered. Not applicable.
1995 Emergency Power IV Project (Tanzania) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
1995 Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project (Brazil) Yes. Denied. Limit Panel role in monitoring.
1995 Financing of Hydroelectric Dams in the Bío Bío River (Chile) No. Not registered. Not applicable.
1996 Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (Bangladesh) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
1996 Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project (Argentina/ Paraguay) Yes. Partial approval. A limited
review and assessment.
Board has not made any
decisions. Still pending.
1996 Jute Sector Adjustment Credit Project (Bangladesh) No. Bank withdrew the
project.
Not applicable. Bank halted funding.
1997 Itaparica Resettlement and Irrigation Project (Brazil) Yes. Denied. Panel process bypassed.
1997 NTPC Power Generation Project (India) Yes. Partial approval. Management Action Plan
(MAP) approved by Board.
1998 Eco-development Project (India) Yes. Denied. Management brought the
project into compliance.
1998 Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Lesotho/South Africa) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
1998 Lagos Drainage and Sanitation Project (Nigeria) No. Management
compensated affected people.
Not applicable.
1999 Land Reform Poverty Alleviation Project, 1st Request (Brazil) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
1999 Highlands Water Project (Lesotho) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
1999 Western Poverty Reduction Project (China) Yes. Approved. Bank withdrew the project.
1999 Special Structural Adjustment Loan (Argentina) No. Problems already solved. Not applicable.
1999 Land Reform Poverty Alleviation Project, 2nd Request (Brazil) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
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1999 Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (Kenya) Yes. Denied. Management brought the
project into compliance.
1999 Mining Development & Environmental Control Technical Assistance
Project (Ecuador)
Yes. Denied. Management brought the
project into compliance.
2000 NTPC Power Generation Project, 2nd Request (India) No. Not registered. Not applicable.
2001 Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project (Chad) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2001 Coal Sector Environmental & Social Mitigation Project (India) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2001 Third Power Project, Fourth Power Project & Proposed Bujagli
Hydropower Project (Uganda)
Yes. Partial approval. Board approved actions by
management.
2001 Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan (Papua New Guinea) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2002 Reform Project for Water and Telecommunication Sectors (Paraguay/
Argentina)
Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2002 Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Cameroon) Yes. Partial approval. Board approved actions by
management.
2003 Manila Second Sewerage Project (Philippines) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2003 Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (Cameroon) No. Not registered. Not applicable.
2004 Indigenous and Community Biodiversity Project (Mexico) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2004 Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental
Management Project (Colombia)
Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2004 Mumbai Urban Transport Project (India) Yes. Pending.
2004 National Drainage Program Project (Pakistan) Yes. Approved. Board approved the Action Plan.
2004 Public Works and Employment Creation Project (Burundi) No. Not registered. Not applicable.
2005 Forest Concession Management & Control Pilot Project (Cambodia) Yes. Partial approval. MAP prepared.
2005 Transitional Support for Economic Recovery Credit (Congo) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2006 Land Administration Project (Honduras) Yes. Partial approval. MAP prepared.
2006 Mine Closure and Social Mitigation Project (Rumania) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2006 West African Gas Pipeline Project (Nigeria) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
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2006 Parana Biodiversity Project (Brazil) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2006 Santa Fe Road Infrastructure Project & Provincial Road Infrastructure
Project (Argentina)
Deferral. Awaiting further
development
Not applicable.
2007 Private Power Generation Project (Uganda) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2007 Uttaranchal Decentralized Watershed Development Project (India) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2007 Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project (Albania) Yes. Partial approval. MAP completed.
2007 Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-Up Project (Albania) Yes. Approved. Project suspended.
2007 Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (Ghana) Yes. Partial approval. MAP approved by Board.
2007 Urban Development Project & Douala Infrastructure Development
Project (Cameroon)
No. Not registered. Not applicable.
2007 Santa Fe Infrastructure Project (Argentina) Yes. Partial approval. Management Action Plan
approved by Board.
2007 Bogota Urban Services Project (Colombia) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2009 Land Administration Project (Panama) Yes. Pending.
2009 Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (Congo) Under progress.
2009 Institutional Reform Development Policy Financing (Yemen) Deferral. Not applicable.
2009 Mumbai Urban Transport Project (India) No. Found ineligible. Not applicable.
2009 Export Development Project (Kenya) No. Not registered. Not applicable.
2009 Land Management & Administration Project (Cambodia) Yes. Pending.
2009 Lima Transport Project (Peru) Yes. Pending.
2009 Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (Papua New Guinea) Yes. Pending.
2010 Tax Administration Reform Project (Pakistan) Under progress.
2010 Proposed Eskom Investment Support Project (South Africa) Under progress.
Sources: Compiled by author.
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